

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70-00211R000800120008-1

*Case File*  
*O/Sec*  
  
*15 Oct 1963*

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Office of Computer Services**

**ATTENTION**

:

**THROUGH**

:

**OS/ADP Team**

**SUBJECT**

**: Disposal of Special Clearance Center Tapes**

1. Attached is the concurrence from the Chief, Special Clearance Center, authorizing disposal of magnetic tape records related to data in his Office. It also agrees to storage of Special Center tape records in the OCS tape library so long as it remains an approved T and TK area.

2. After his discussion of my recommendation, I interpret his position to be, that there is need to have available:

- a. The tapes of current data in alphabetical and organizational sequence. (2 tapes usually).
- b. Last month's organization sequenced tape.
- c. The tape of the current up-date data after sort into organization sequence.
- d. Any prior month's tapes until the 20th of the current month (i. e., erase August or earlier material on 20 October).

3. The foregoing would provide for possible reconstruction of three months of data during the week of the up-date operation. The up-date scheduled for the second Tuesday may occur as early as the 8th or as late as the 14th. If there is no adverse customer reaction to the

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product within the up-date week, the old tapes may be erased on the 20th of the month. That would leave four tapes still available -- the current alpha, org. and up-date tapes and the immediately preceding month's organization tape.

4. As for the "data disposal" procedure, it is imperative that the data become unreconstructable and unusable after the tape erasing or masking operation. Further, it is necessary that positive action be taken to obliterate the data once a tape is removed from the tape storage file for data disposal. It is unacceptable for an obsolete tape to be moved from the tape file and be placed among other tapes available for reuse. Although such reuse action may ultimately obliterate or erase the data, this leaves too great a period of danger of compromise or inadvertent revelation of special clearance data to persons without a "need-to-know."

5. I believe your office would be well advised to employ the same records "disposal documentation" and "officer verification" concerning destruction of tape data as is used by security officers when burning documents. I know for certain that a T and TK officer will want to check your disposal procedures and documentation in the near future.

  
Records Management Officer  
Office of Security

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